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Abstract. Metallic pressure tanks used in space missions are inherently vulnerable to hypervelocity 
impacts from micrometeoroids and orbital debris; thereby knowledge of impact damage and its effect 
on the tank integrity is crucial to a spacecraft risk assessment. This paper describes tests that have been 
performed to assess the effects of hypervelocity impact (HVI) damage on Titanium alloy (Ti-6Al-4V) 
pressure vessels burst pressure and characteristics. The tests consisted of a pair of HVI impact tests on 
water-filled Ti-6Al-4V tanks (water being used as a surrogate to the actual propellant) and subsequent 
burst tests as well as a burst test on an undamaged control tank. The tanks were placed behind 
Aluminum (Al) shields and then each was impacted with a 7 km/s projectile. The resulting impact 
debris plumes partially penetrated the Ti-6Al-4V tank surfaces resulting in a distribution of craters. 
During the burst tests, the tank that failed at a lower burst pressure did appear to have the failure 
initiating at a crater site with observed spall cracks. A fracture mechanics analysis showed that the 
tanks failure at the impact location may have been due to a spall crack that formed upon impact of a 
fragmentation on the Titanium surface. This result was corroborated with a finite element analysis 
from calculated Von-Mises and hoop stresses.  
Keywords: Hypervelocity impacts, plume ejecta, depth of penetration, fracture, Stress Intensity 
Factor, toughness. 
PACS: 96.24.Pq, 62.20.mm. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Metallic and composite surfaces of high 
pressure vessels (pressurant tanks) and propellant 
tanks are vulnerable to exposure to hypervelocity 
impacts from secondary plumes that are generated 
from primary impacts on the outer surfaces of a 
spacecraft. In a spacecraft Micrometeoroids and 
Orbital Debris (MMOD) risk assessment, a critical 
depth of penetration criterion is usually assigned to 
each vulnerable surface. If a predicted depth 
exceeds the assigned limit, the surface is deemed to 
be a failure with an assumption in a loss of mission 
or a loss of crew. The motivation of this work is to 
establish a process to determine/assess Micro-
meteoroids and Orbital Debris damage criteria on 
metal and composite pressure vessels based on 
analyses and tests. HVI tests were first performed 
on biaxially stressed coupons in order to assess the 
stress effects on craters depth and materials. The 
tests described here used HVI and subsequent 
pressure burst tests of Titanium tanks to identify 
the threshold depth of penetration criterion for 
metallic tanks. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110014517 2019-08-30T16:30:40+00:00Z
EXPERIMENTS 
Hypervelocity Impact Testing 
The two HVI tests reported here have been 
performed at NASA White Sands Testing Facility 
(WSTF). Each test consisted of launching a particle 
at about 7 km/s at an aluminum shield behind 
which an unpressurized titanium tank partially 
filled with water was fixed in a an orientation 
normal with respect to the ejected secondary plume 
from the first penetration through the aluminum 
shield. Figure 1 shows a basic schematic of the 
HVI tests. The projectiles for the two HVI tests 
were 1.6 mm Aluminum and 3.6 mm Nylon at ~7 
km/s. A scan of the tank thickness was performed 
on the two tanks before impact for proper tank 
orientation and post testing surface 
characterization. The thickness ranged from 0.04" 
to 0.1" from the welding joint to the boss. The goal 
was to achieve depths of penetration ranging from 
10 to about 40% for the two impacting projectiles.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the hypervelocity impact on the 
titanium tanks partially filled with water. 
Pressure Burst Testing 
In order to assess the effects of cratering on 
the burst pressure of the tanks, a series of three 
burst pressure tests were performed on the two 
HVI-damaged and one undamaged tank. During 
pressurization, the pressure as a function of time 
was recorded. Moreover, two biaxial strain gages 
were used to record the local strain as the tank was 
pressurized. One of the strain gages was positioned 
at the damaged area and the other positioned 
opposite from the first on the same meridian.  
RESULTS 
Hypervelocity Impact 
Al 1.6 mm projectile on shielded #0062 tank 
Unexpectedly high damage to the tank #0062 
was induced from the aluminum 1.6 mm projectile 
launched at 7 km/s. This was due to the late 
separation of the projectile carrier “Sabot,” The 
late separation resulted in pieces of the sabot 
impacting the 0.04" thick aluminum shield, and 
consequently more fragmentation impacted the 
titanium tank and resulted in craters that were over 
50% depth of penetration. 
Nylon 3.6 mm projectile on shielded #0092 tank 
The nylon projectile, unlike the aluminum 
projectile was launched successfully and impacted 
the aluminum 0.04" shield resulting in a 
perforation and aluminum fragments ejecting from 
the target at reduced velocity and impacting the 
tank surface. The distribution of the crater was 
uniform over the surface and that is attributed to 
the melting and vaporization of the nylon projectile 
upon impact. This was also observed in previous 
HVI tests performed on biaxially stressed coupons 
with the same shield configuration and standoff 
distance [1]. The depth of penetration for this 
impact ranged from 10 to 40% as was seen in the 
coupon HVI tests. 
Burst Pressure Testing 
The two damaged tanks (#0062 and #0092) 
and a third undamaged tank #0251 were 
pressurized to burst at WSTF. As shown in Fig. 2, 
tank #0251 failed at the ellipsoidal ends opposite of 
the hemispherical end that was targeted in the HVI 
tests. Tank #0092 failed at the same ellipsoidal end 
as #0251. However, Fig. 3 shows that tank #0062 
failed at the hemispherical end that was targeted 
and where excessive and unexpected damage 
occurred because of the late sabot separation. 
Moreover, the #0062 tank failed at significantly 
lower pressure of 580 psig compared to tank #0251 
that failed at 795 psig and tank #0092 at 785 psig.  
The strain versus time history of tank 
#0251during pressurization and up to the failure is 
shown in Fig. 4, while Fig. 5 shows the same data 
for tank #0062. From the strain-time history curve, 
it was apparent that the failure of tank #0062 was 
preceded by a time interval of declining strain 
which could be caused by a slow depressurization 
of the tank. At about 575 sec, an abrupt decline in 
strain was observed similar to tank #0251 at about 
~520 sec. However for tank #0062, the interval 
between the peak strain and the abrupt decline in 
strain invited suggestions of slow damage 
progression (a stable crack growth process) before 
final failure. 
 
 
Figure 2. Tank #0251failure at Ellipsoidal end. Tank 
#0092 exhibited the same failure. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Tank #0062 failure at the damaged area. 
 
From a high speed camera recording at 800 
frames/s, the tank unzipping was observed to occur 
in a time interval less than 12.5 ms which is the 
time duration between two consecutive frames. The 
high speed camera was only used in pressurizing 
tank #0062, and therefore we could not evaluate 
the failure time scale of the other two tanks.  
From the pressure-time curve of tank #0062 
and from a close examination of the crack line and 
a crater that exhibited spallation, it was suspected 
that the failure of tank #0062 was due to crack 
propagation rather than a material failure due to 
loss of strength under the applied pressure. Tanks 
#0251 and #0092 on the other hand failed at 
significantly higher pressure such that the ultimate 
strength of Titanium was exceeded. For instance, at 
a pressure of 795 psig, the shell theory predicts a 
stress of about 149 ksi which exceeds the titanium 
ultimate strength. This prompted the need for a 
linear fracture analysis to gauge the stress intensity 
factor and compare it to the titanium fracture 
toughness. 
 
Figure 4. Strain-time curve for tank #0251. 
 
 
Figure 5. Strain-time curve for tank #0062 that failed at 
the damaged area. 
Fracture and Finite Element Analyses 
A linear fracture mechanics analysis was 
performed on a spall crack that was detected in the 
process of examination of the crack line of tank 
#0062 and that resulted from a secondary plume 
particle impact. The code NASGRO version 6.1 
with routine SC03 for external and internal cracks 
was used to perform this analysis. The formulation 
is based on the work of Newman and Raju, [2,3]. 
The option of internal crack was exercised in this 
calculation. The spall crack characteristics were 
measured from a higher magnification photograph 
obtained from the crack line. The crack depth was 
0.0082" and crack length 0.05".  
Based on the aforementioned internal crack 
characteristics and an internal pressure of 580 psig, 
the stress intensity factor was calculated and 
plotted as a function of the crack depth as shown in 
Fig. 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Calculated stress intensity factor and 
comparison with the Titanium toughness from literature. 
 
For a crack depth of 0.0082", the stress 
intensity factor for crack depth-Ka exceeded the 
titanium toughness. This suggests that the failure 
may have been driven by fracture mechanics. The 
stress intensity factor for the crack length Kc for a 
crack depth of 0.0082" fell in the middle of the Ti 
toughness range. This range was reported because 
we have not measured the toughness of the 
titanium used in the tanks.  
To further corroborate the argument, a finite 
element analysis (FEA) on the tank was performed. 
For a pressure of 580 psi, the FEA showed in Fig. 7 
that the Von-Mises stresses/criterion was below the 
yield limit of Ti-6Al-4V, yet the calculated stresses 
from the shell theory showed yield and ultimate 
strength exceedence at the higher burst pressures of 
tanks #0092 and #0125.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Finite Element Analysis of Ti tank at 580 psig. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
Since spall cracks were suspected of resulting 
in the observed 27% reduction in the burst pressure 
of the tank, the recommendation is to limit the 
allowable depth of penetration that does not result 
in back spallations. This recommendation needs to 
be more specific based on pressure wall thickness, 
material and impact conditions. Future work 
encompasses a thorough evaluation of the Ti 
material strength and detailed look at the crack line 
with diagnostics such as Scanning Electron 
Microscopy and elemental analyses in order to 
assess the evidence of the stable crack propagation 
prior to final failure 
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o Objective
 Assess the titanium tanks burst pressure after experiencing partial 
penetration from the plume generated from a hypervelocity impact on 
an aluminum shield.
o Based on burst pressure testing of two 
shielded Ti 6Al4V tanks damaged by the 
Aluminum shield plume, and one undamaged 
tank, 
 This work suggests that the failure of one 
tank (0062) was due to a spall crack induced 
by crater that formed from the impact of the 
plume on the Ti tank surface. 
 Tank 0062 burst pressure was lower 
than other two tanks
 At burst pressure Von-Mises stresses 
were lower  than the yield  stress
 The stress intensity factor was greater 
than the Ti alloy toughness
Background, Objective and 
Approach
• Background
– Establish through a well 
coordinated effort, a process to 
determine/assess 
Micrometeoroids and Orbital 
Debris damage criteria on 
metal and composite pressure 
vessels
• Phase-I addresses and 
concentrates on the metallic 
pressure vessels MMOD driven 
failure criteria
• Phase II addresses and 
concentrates on the composite 
overwrap pressure vessels 
(COPV) failure criterion
S
• Approach
Stressed and 
Unstressed 
Coupon HVI 
Tests
Unpressurized
Tank HVI and 
Burst Testing
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Hypervelocity Impact Test Article
Test Article
• Launched projectile penetrates a 0.04” aluminum plate
• The plume emanating from the first projectile-aluminum 
plate interaction bombards the titanium dome surface 
and produces a spectrum of partial penetrations on the 
dome surface.
Test Conditions
• Two Tanks were impacted with a hypervelocity 
projectiles
• Thickness scan performed on the two HVI test tanks
• The two tanks were unpressurized when HVI tested
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Damage Distribution and 
Characteristics
• Damage Distribution of Tank 0062 caused by 
1.6 mm Al projectile and Sabot pieces
– Exhibits two areas of damage which may have 
been caused by the sabot piece impacting the Al 
shield
– Distribution exhibited deeper than expected 
impacts
• Damage Distribution of Tank 0092 caused by 
3.6 mm Nylon projectile
– Exhibited  Uniform damage distribution as seen 
in stressed and unstressed coupon HVI tests
6/24/2011
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0062 Tank
0092 Tank
Post Impact Burst Testing
• One pristine and the two HVI damaged tanks were 
pressurized to burst
• Data included Pressure-Time, High and normal Speed video
• The remaining two  (undamaged and damaged tanks) failed 
at the elliptic end. [Fig. A]
• Tank SN 51 P0062 failed at the impacted area [Fig. B & C].  
A-Tanks P0251 P0092 
failed at Elliptic end
B-Tank with crack shown in 
the impacted area
C-Crack line superimposed on 
tank 
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Pressure and Strain Data
Decrease in strain 
eluding to a relief 
process followed by 
the tank failure.  
Failure of Tank 0062 could have been induced by a crack 
propagation 
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Approach to Failure Analysis
• Determination of the failure mode of the 
tank under burst pressure
– Failure caused by loss of strength
– Failure cause by dynamic crack 
propagation
• Perform a fracture analysis and compare 
toughness of Titanium with the predicted 
stress intensity factors
– On the inside surface where a spall has 
been observed
• a = 0.0082”, 2c = 0.05”, 
• c = 0.025” 
• a/c = 0.33
– Used NASGRO to compute the stress 
intensity factor and compared with the 
Titanium toughness
6/24/2011
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Linear Fracture Analysis
• At the observed crack depth of 0.0082” 
– Ka exceeds the maximum Ti toughness
– Kc matches the middle of the Ti toughness of ~70 ksi-in1/2.  
• This suggests that a crack opening from the internal pressure 
occurred and perhaps the crack initiation was due to the spallation
Need to look at the 
area of  crack to see 
any traces of  crack 
propagation and 
propagation speed
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Tank Preliminary Finite Element 
Analysis 
• A plastic-elastic axi-symmetric 
finite element analysis was 
performed on the tank with a 
x-y coordinates provided from 
the thickness profile
• Pressure in tank assumed at 
580 psi
• Yield strength at 125 ksi
• Ultimate strength at 145 ksi
• Results show that at 580 psi, the hoop and 
Von Mises stresses are below the ultimate 
the yield strength of Ti 6Al4V
• This corroborates the findings that failure at 
580 psi was caused by a crack propagation 
and was not driven by strength exceedence
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Axial Direction
Consequence of Rupture-Measurement 
of Fluid Velocity
• Fluid Velocity Measurements from high 
speed video
• Flow upon crack opening accelerated 
and then reached a reasonably constant 
velocity of ~17 m/s
smV fluid 9.27.16 
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• Concerning is the quick dispersion of 
highly reactive propellant, contact with 
other nearby hardware and the resulting 
consequences of such a contact
Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
 Failure of the damaged tank 0062 is induced by a spall crack that propagated 
and resulted in the tank rupture at lower pressure
 Failure of the two tanks that ruptured at the ellipsoidal ends may have been 
induced by an exceedence of the ultimate strength of Ti where significant 
stresses were experienced in the area of smallest Ti thickness
– For the burst pressure of 795 psig, the estimated stresses at the thinner boss area 
exceeded the ultimate strength of Ti [Calc. ~ 149 ksi compared to u ~ 130-145 ksi] 
Recommendations
 Based on this limited work, it is recommended that:
– The allowable crater depth (failure criterion) must not result in a spall on the back/inner 
surface exposed to the tank pressure. 
Future Work
 Take a closer look at the crack lines on tanks that failed at the elliptic end 
away from the impacted area
 Look for crack evidence and propagation
 Residual Strength and stress-strain curve measurements for higher fidelity 
finite element modeling of the Ti tank with damage modeling
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 This effort stems from a 
program whose objective is to 
establish the allowable depth 
of penetration from 
hypervelocity impacts on 
metallic and composite 
surfaces.  
– Application to space programs and 
specifically Orion Service module 
propellant and pressure tanks
 The program was partially 
funded
– Blue boxes in flow chart have 
been completed
 Similar effort can be 
applied to COPVs.  
 A plan in place to assess 
the allowable depth of 
penetration on COPVs
using a building block 
approach.  
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